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This paper investigates the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide 
with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies when initial endowments are private 
information and unreported endowments are consumed (withheld) but are not destroyed. It will 
be noted that the mechanism presented here is individually feasible, balanced, and continuous. 
Besides, we allow preferences of agents to be nontotal-nontransitive and discontinuous. 
1. Introduction 
Since Hurwicz (1972) formalized a general model to deal with the 
incentives problem which is a basic aspect that a social system in general and 
economic system in particular needs to consider, there have been many 
mechanisms which solve free-rider (incentives) problems in the sense that 
they result in Pareto efficient allocations for public goods economies when 
individual self-interested behavior is characterized by iqash-equilibrium stra- 
tegies. Groves and Ledyard (1977) were the first to propose a mechanism 
that yields Pareto-e&cient allocations through Nash equilibria. Since then 
there have been many mechanisms which implement the Lindahl correspon- 
dence at Nash equilibrium points such as those in Hurwicz (1979), Walker 
(1981), Hurwicz et al. (1984), Tian (1989, 1990, 1991), Li et al. (1990), Tian 
and Li (1991) among others. 
Among these mechanisms, Hurwicz et al. (1984) are the first to consider 
the case where the initial endowments are private information. This situation 
would certainly increase the size of the message space’ but would reduce 
the information requirements on the designer. They consider both cases of 
destroying and withholding unreported endowments. Their mechanisms 
allow each agent to reveal information about his own endowment in a way 
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that he can understate but not overstate his own endowment so as to 
guarantee the feasibility even at disequilibrium points. The intuition here is 
straightforward: if a mechanism allows agents to overstate their endowments, 
then it allows for infeasible outcomes - it will sometimes attempt to allocate 
more than it is possible, given the true aggregate endowment. Their 
mechanisms, however, are discontinuous; small variations in an agent’s 
strategy choice may lead to large jumps in the resulting allocations, and they 
require each agent to announce not only his own endowment but also 
others’ endowments, and thus the sizes of the message spaces are very large. 
Tian (1989, 1991) improved the results of Hurwicz et al. (1984) by giving 
continuous mechanisms with much lower dimensions of message spaces. 
Further these mechanisms have the advantage that each agent is required to 
announce only his own endowment but not others’ endowments. But these 
mechanisms only consider the case where the unreported endowments are 
cancelled (destroyed) rather than consumed so that the mechanisms are 
merely weakly balanced but not balanced. Also, these mechanisms, like the 
mechanisms of Hurwicz et al. (1984), enforce agents to state correctly their 
endowments in equilibrium. In other words, agents do not choose to 
understate their endowments and would wish to overstate their endowments 
(which is not permitted). Consequently, there is not much left of an incentive 
compatibility problem. 
Also, when a mechanism is merely weakly balanced, the allocation at a 
disequilibrium point may be less than the total endowments. Should this 
happen, some resources are not completely used even though preferences of 
agents are strictly monotone. Thus, although a weakly balanced mechanism 
guarantees the feasibility of allocations, there still remains an incentive 
problem unless some additional enforcement is carried out. In other words, 
one has to make sure that goods which do not belong to any agent by the 
rule of mechanism are destroyed or individuals will be better off if the 
unused resources are consumed by them. Even in the case where the 
unreported endowments are surely destroyed, there is another problem, 
namely, the mechanism results in Pareto inefficient allocations since the 
balancedness of allocations is a necessary condition for Pareto efficiency. On 
the other hand, if a mechanism is balanced, even if disequilibrium points are 
used to compute the allocations, one can guarantee that resources are not 
wasted or destroyed.* 
A similar situation prevailed with regard to the Nash-implementation of 
‘Note that these disequilibrium allocations do not necessarily result in Pareto inefficient 
allocations since the set of Lindahl allocations, which coincides with the set of Nash allocations 
of the mechanism that implements the Lindahl correspondence, is, in general, much smaller than 
the set of Pareto efficient allocations. Thus a disequilibrium allocation can still be a Pareto 
efficient allocation. 
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the Walrasian correspondence until Hong (1990) designed a mechanism 
which implements the Walrasian correspondence in the case of withholding. 
In addition, her mechanism is individually feasible, balanced, and continuous. 
This paper modifies the mechanisms of Tian (1989, 1991) to the case of 
withholding by giving a simple mechanism whose Nash allocations coincide 
with the Lindahl allocations for public goods economies. As will be noted, 
this mechanism is well-behaved in the sense that it is individually feasible, 
balanced (not merely weakly balanced), and continuous. Also, we al!ow 
preferences of agents to be nontotal-nontransitive. This situation, as Tian 
(1991) pointed out, is potentially very important since in many cases - in 
particular, in the case where economic entities are composed of more than 
one individual; it is natural that the preferences for such agents would be 
nontransitive or nontotal due to the problem of aggregating the individuals’ 
preferences. This is particularly true for public goods (projects) since choices 
of public goods are likely to be determined by communities. Because of well 
known problems in aggregating preferences of individuals, it may be 
necessary (or desirable) to represent the preferences of groups (communities) 
as nontransitive or nontotal. 
It should be noted that the mechanism presented in this paper has the 
advantage that agents are not required to report their true endowments even 
at equilibrium. This is a very interesting and important property. Since we 
do not need to assume that agents have to show their announced endow- 
ments to the designer or are enforced to report the true endowments, there is 
a big difference between this situation and one in which endowments are 
assumed to be known to the designer and the incentive compatibility 
problem is well taken. Another advantage is that each agent is required to 
announce only his own endowment but not others’ endowments and thus it 
uses a message space of much lower dimension than those of Hurwicz et al. 
(1984). 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets forth a public goods 
model and presents a mechanism which has the desirable properties men- 
tioned above. Section 3 shows that this mechanism fully implements the 
Lindahl correspondence. Finally, the concluding remarks are offered in 
section 4. 
2. Public goods model and mechanism 
2.1. Economic environments 
In an economy with public goods, there are n agents (groups, players, or 
voters) who consume one private good and K public goods, x being private 
(as a numeraire) and y public. The single private good x can be thought of 
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as a Hicksian composite commodity or money, and public goods y can be 
thought of as K public projects. Denote by N = { 1,2,. . . , n} the set of agents. 
Each agent’s characteristic is denoted by e, = (Gi, Pi), where Gi is the initial 
endowment of the private good and Pi is the strict (irreflexive) preference 
relation defined on (WvK which may be nontotal or nontransitive. We 
assume that there are no initial endowments of public goods, but that the 
public goods can be produced from the private good under constant returns 
to scale. That is, the production function fk is given by yk= f “(x) =( l/qk)x 
for each k = 1 ,. . . , K. Thus each unit of public good yk requires qk units of 
private good. Hence the feasibility constraint becomes 
(1) 
where q=(q’,...,qK)E@+. 
An economy is the full vector e=(e,,. . .,e,) and the set of all such 
economies is denoted by E. The following assumptions are made on E: 
Assumption 1. nz3.4 
Assumption 2. Gi>O for all iEN. 
Assumption 3. Pi is convex’ and strict monotonically increasing in the 
private good. 
Assumption 4. For all iE N, (Xi, y) Pi(xf, y’) for all xi E R, +, xi E X!,, and y, 
y’~ IRK+, where aRy is the boundary of Rm+. 
Remark 1. Assumption 4 was called ‘indispensability of money’ by Mas- 
Cole11 (1980). This assumption cannot be dispensed. Tian (1988) showed that 
the (constrained) Lindahl correspondence violates Maskin’s (1977) monotoni- 
city condition only under Assumptions l-3 and thus cannot be Nash- 
implemented by an individually feasible and balanced mechanism. 
sin this paper we only consider the case of strict preferences but the same theorems can be 
obtained for weak preferences. From the results of Kim and Richter (1986) and Tian (1992) we 
know that the weak preference approach and the strict preference approach are equally valid: 
definitions and theorems in one approach correspond to definitions and theorems in the other 
approach. 
4This is a necessary condition for the balanced and continuous implementation. Kwan and 
Nakamura (1987) proved that there are no balanced and continuous mechanisms which 
implement the Lindahl correspondence for two-agent economies. 
‘Pi is convex if for bundles a, b, c with 0~15 1 and c= la+( 1 -I)b, the relation a Pi b 
implies c Pi b. 
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2.2. Lindahl allocations 
An allocation (x, y) =(x1,. . . , x,, y) is feasible for an economy e if 
(x, Y) E K+ K and (1) holds. 
An allocation (x*, y*) is a Lindahl allocation for an economy e if it is 
feasible and there are personalized price vectors 4T E [w?, one for each i, such 
that; 
(1) xF+@y*5Gi for all iEN; 
(2) for all ieN, there does not exist (xi, y) such that (xi, y)Pi(xT, y*) and 
xi+q,*yskGi; 
(3) x1= i 4: = q. 
Denote by L(e) the set of all such allocations. 
An allocation (x, y) is Pareto-optimal with respect to the strict preference 
protile P=(PI,..., P,) if it is feasible and there does not exist another feasible 
allocation (x’, y’) such that (xi, y’) Pi(xi, y) for all in N. 
An allocation (x, y) is individually rational with respect to P if 1 
(wi, 0) Pi (xi, y) for all i E N. Here ‘ 1’ stands for ‘it is not the case that’. 
2.3. Mechanism 
In the following we will present an individually feasible, balanced, and 
continuous mechanism which fully Nash-implements the Lindahl correspon- 
dence when the withheld endowments are consumed but not destroyed. 
Let Mi denote the ith message domain. Its elements are written as m, and 
called messages. Let M =nl= 1 Mi denote the message space. The message 
spaces of agents are defined as follows. 
For each iE N, his/her message domain is of the form 
Mi ~(0, l] X (0, $i] X RK X [WK. (2) 
A generic element of Mi is (Si, wi,~i, yi) whose components have the 
following interpretations. The component di denotes the degree of desirability 
for the private good. In particular, when di= 1, agent i wishes that public 
goods would not be produced. The designer will use the smallest 6i of all 
agents to determine the level of public goods [see eq. (4) below]. The 
component wi denotes a profession of agent i’s endowment, the inequality 
0 < wi 5 Gi means that the agent cannot overstate his own endowment; on the 
other hand, the endowment can be understated, but the claimed endowment 
wi must be positive. The component pi denotes the price vector of public 
goods proposed by agent i for use in other agents’ budget constraints, and 
the component yi denotes the proposed level of public goods that agent i is 
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willing to contribute (a negative yi means the agent wants to receive a 
subsidy from the society). 
Define the personalized price of each public good k for the ith consumer 
by 
q:(m) =bf + f UfjCp5, 
j=l 
(3) 
;Fre ~~=lbf=qk, ~~=lufj=O, c&=0, and ~j”=lla~jl>O for ieN and k= 
, ,..., K. In addition, the coefficients ofj are chosen so that the rank of the 
matrices [at] is equal to n- 1 for all k. Observe that, by construction, 
CL 1 cd4 = 4 f or all me M and each agent’s personalized prices are indepen- 
dent of his own messages [i.e., qi(m*) =q,(m*/mi, i) for any mix Mi]. Here 
4itm) =(4!Cm) ,. . .,4”(m)). Note that even though qi(m) is only a function of 
the price-component, (c#J~, . . . , q$,), of the message m, we can write it as a 
function of m without loss of generality. 
Define a correspondence B: M-2”: by 
B(m)={yER::(l-6(m))w,-qi(m)yzOViEN}, (4) 
which is clearly a continuous correspondence with non-empty compact 
convex values. Here 6(m) =min {6,, . . . ,6,}. 
Define the outcome function for public goods Y: M-+B by 
which is the closest point to j. Here j = I:= 1 yi. Then Y(m) is single-valued 
and continuous on M.‘j 
For each individual i, define the taxing function pi: M-rR by 
Tim) = 4i(m) Y(m). (6) 
Then 
i$l Tit@ = 4(m) Y(m). 
The outcome function X(m) : M -+ R + is given by 
(7) 
6This is because Y(m) is an upper semi-continuous correspondence by Berge’s Maximum 
Theorem [see Debreu (1959, p. 19)] and single-valued [see Mas-Cole11 (1985, p. 28)]. 
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x,(m)=wi-qi(m)Y(m). (8) 
Note that X,(m)>0 by the definition of the constrained correspondence B 
and the total (final) consumption of agent i for the private good is the sum of 
Xi(m) and (~i-wi). That is, it is the sum of the amount of private good 
allocated by the mechanism and the unreported amount of his/her own 
endowment. 
Thus the outcome function is continuous on M, (X(m), Y(m)) E lfF++“, and 
jl [Xi(m)+tii-Wi]+qY(m)= i Gi, 
i=l 
for all n E M. 
From (9), we have 
jl Xi(m) + 9Y(m) = i$l wi, 
(9) 
(10) 
which means the aggregate consumption of the private good allocated by the 
mechanism is equal to the aggregate of endowments reported by agents for 
all m E M. 
Denote h: M+IW”,fK the outcome function, or more explicitly, hi(m) = 
(Xi(m), Y(m)). Then the mechanism consists of (M, h) defined on E. By the 
constructions of the mechanism, the mechanism (M, h) is individually feasible 
(i.e., (Xi(m) + Gi- Wi, Y(m)) E IWvK for all i E N and all m E M), balanced [i.e., 
(9) holds for all rnE M], and continuous. 
A message m* = (mr, . . . , rnz)E M is said to be a Nash equilibrium of the 
mechanism (M, h) in the presence of withholding for an economy e if for 
any i E N and for all m, E Mi, 
(11) 
where (m*/mi, i) =(mr,. . . , mT_ I, mi, mi*, 1,. . . , m,*). [h(m*) +(ti- w*, 0)] is then 
called a Nash (equilibrium) allocation of the mechanism for the economy e. 
Denote by V,,,(e) the set of all such Nash equilibria and by N,,,(e) the set 
of all such Nash (equilibrium) allocations. The mechanism (M, h) is said to 
fully Nash-implement the Lindahl correspondence L on E, if, for all eE E, 
N&e) = L(e). 
3. Implementation results 
The remainder of this paper is devoted to the proof of equivalence between 
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Nash allocations and Lindahl allocations. Theorem 1 below proves that 
every Nash allocation is a Lindahl allocation. Theorem 2 below proves that 
every Lindahl allocation is a Nash allocation. 
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1-4, if the withholding mechanism defined 
above has a Nash equilibrium m*, then the Nash allocation (X(m*) +w- w*, 
Y(m*)) is a Lindahl allocation with (ql(m*),. . .,q.(m*)) as the Lindahl price 
vector, i.e., NMJe) c L(e). 
Proof. Let m* be a Nash equilibrium. Now we prove that 
(X(m*) + 6 -w*, Y(m*)) is a Lindahl allocation with (qt(m*), . . . , q,(m*)) as the 
Lindahl price vector. Since the mechanism is individually feasible and 
balanced, and ~~= I qi(m*) = q as well as [Xi(m*) + Gi - wz] + qi(m*) Y(m*) = tii 
for all ie N, we only need to show that each individual is maximizing his/her 
preferences. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is some 
(Xi, Y) E R:+K such that (xi, y) Pi(Xt(m*) +wi-w~, Y(m*)) and xi+qi(m*)ys 
wt. Because of monotonicity of preferences, it will be enough to confine 
ourselves to the case of xi + qi(m*)y = di. Let 
X~i=IXi+(l-i) [Xi(m*)+wi--W:], 
y,=ly+(l-A)Y(m*). 
Then by convexity of preferences we have (x,~, yn) Pi (Xi(m*) + di - w:, Y(m*)) 
for any 0~2~1. Also (x,~,Y~)E[W:+~ and xAi + qi(m*)y, = pi. NOW suppose 
that player i chooses 6i SO that 6i<6(m*), yi= y,-~~+ y?, and keeps wf and 
$JT unchanged. Then 6(m*/mt, i) = 6t < 6(m*) and thus (1 - 6(m*/mi, i))wT - 
qj(m*). Y(m*) > (1 - S(m*))@ - qj(m*) Y(m*) 20 for all j E N by the construc- 
tion of the mechanism. Thus, we have (1 - 6(m*/mi, i))wr - qj(m*/mi, i)y, > 0 
for all jE N as ,I is sufficiently small. Hence y, E B(m*/m,, i) and therefore 
Y(m*/+, i) = yi and Xi(m*/mi, i) = W: - qi(m*) Y(m*/mi, i) = wt - qi(m*) y,. Then 
X;(m*/mi, i) + di - W: = ~~2. From (Xin, y,J Pi (X,(m*) + wi - w:, Y(m*)), we have 
(Xi(m*/mi, i) + wi - Wf, Y(m*/mi, i)) Pi (X,(m*) + wi - w:, Y(m*)). 
This contradicts the hypothesis that (X(m*) + wi- w:, Y(m*)) E N,.,(e). 
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1-4, if (x*, y*) is a Lindahl allocation with 
the Lindahl price vector q* = (47,. . . , qz), then there is a Nash equilibrium m* 
for the withholding mechanism defined above such that X,(m*) + wt - w? = XT, 
and qi(m*) = q:, for all i E N, Y(m*) = y*, i.e., L(e) c N,,,(e). 
Proof. We first note that x* E R’!+  by Assumption 4. We need to show that 
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there is a message m* such that (x*, y*) is a Nash allocation. Let w: = 4i, let 
ai be sufficiently small so that (1 -6(m*))di-qTy* >O, and let 
(Y?, . . .? Y,*, 4T,. * ., c$,*) be a solution of the following linear equations system: 
Y*= i Yi, 
i=l 
(12) 
qTk = bf + i afj4kj$kj, 
j=i 
for k=l,..., K. Then, it can be easily verified that Y(m*)= y*, and qi(m*)= 
qf, X,(m*) =x*, for all ieN. Notice that qi(m*/mi, i) =qi(m*) for all WQE M,, 
(X(m*/mi, i) + pi- Wi, Y(m*/mi, i)) E [W:+K and [Xi(m*/mi, i) + tii’i- wi] + qi(m*). 
Y(m*/mi, i) = pi for all i E N and m, E Mi. Therefore, we know that 
1 (X,(m*/m,, i) + di - Wi, Y(m*/mi, i)) Pi (Xi(m*), Y(m*)), 
for otherwise it contradicts the fact that (Xi(m*), Y(m*)) is a Lindahl 
allocation. 0 
Remark 2. From Theorem 1, we can see that even at Nash equilibria agents 
are not necessarily reporting their true endowments since we may have 
w: f3,. Indeed, we can modify the proof of Theorem 2 so that the 
underreported endowment is a Nash-equilibrium strategy as long as the 
reported endowments are close enough to the true endowments. Thus every 
Lindahl allocation can be supported by a Nash equilibrium with the false 
announcement about endowments. 
Since Lindahl allocations are Pareto optimal and individually rational, the 
mechanism yields Pareto-optimal and individually rational allocations. 
Summarizing the above discussions, we conclude that for one private and 
K public goods economies E satisfying Assumptions 14, there exists an 
individually feasible, balanced, and continuous mechanism which fully Nash- 
implements the Lindahl correspondence in the presence of withholding. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have presented a simple mechanism which fully 
implements the Lindahl correspondence when endowments are private 
information and unreported endowments are consumed but not destroyed. 
This mechanism has the advantage that agents are not required to report 
their true endowments even at equilibrium and thus the incentive compatibi- 
lity problem for endowments is well taken. In addition, this mechanism 
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requires that each agent announce only his own endowment but not others’ 
endowments and thus it uses a message space of much lower dimension than 
those of Hurwicz et al (1984). Besides, this mechanism is well-behaved in the 
sense that it is individually feasible, balanced, and continuous. Furthermore, 
we allow preferences of agents to be nontotal-nontransitive and disconti- 
nuous. Though this paper only considers Nash-implementation of the 
Lindahl correspondence for public economies with one private good and 
constant returns to scale, the mechanisms uch as those presented in Li et al. 
(1990), Tian (1989), Tian and Li (1991) can be similarly modified to 
implement the Lindahl correspondence for public goods economies with any 
number of goods and decreasing returns to scale. 
Finally it may be remarked that since system (12) has a large multiplicity 
of solutions, the mechanism has a (high dimension) continuum of Nash 
equilibria, even in economies with a unique Lindahl equilibrium. This 
multiple equilibrium problem, however, can be solved by slightly modifying 
the above mechanism and strengthening Assumption 4. Indeed, if we let the 
messages which determine the level of public goods and personalized prices 
be the same, i.e., let 4i = yi (so that the dimension of the message space of the 
modified mechanism is reduced by nK dimensions), and if we replace 
Assumption 4 by Assumption 4’: for all i E N, (Xi, y) Pi(Xf, y’) for all 
(Xi, y) E R:;K, (xi, y’) E a@+“, then the solution of system (12) is unique and 
we can prove that the modified mechanism Nash implements Lindahl 
allocations by using proofs similar to those given in Tian (1990, 1991). Of 
course, in this case, the modified mechanism only implements interior 
Lindahl allocations.’ 
‘Since the multiple equilibrium problem is a general negative aspect of Nash implementation, 
other solution concepts such as those of subgame perfect equilibrium and undominated Nash 
equilibrium have been used in the literature [e.g., Moore and Repullo (1988), Abreu and Sen 
(1990), Palfrey and Srivastava (1991)]. We may also use. these equilibrium concepts which are 
refinements of Nash equilibrium to solve the multiple equilibrium problem of the mechanism 
given in this paper. 
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